After the global financial crisis of 1997-98, the global economy, overall, will return to the high levels of growth reached in the 1960s and 1970s. International trade and investment flows will grow, spurring rapid increases in world GDP. Opposition to further trade liberalization from special interest groups and some governments will not erode the basic trend toward expansion of trade. Emerging market countries increase their political importance. The European Union will achieve its geographic and institutional limits. The EU will not include Russia, but include Turkey and Israel. Technological development and diffusion in some cases triggered by severe environmental or health crises are utilized to grapple effectively with some problems of the developing world. In many countries, the state's role shrinks, as its functions are privatized or performed by public-private partnerships, while global cooperation intensifies on many issues through a variety of international arrangements. Liberalization diffuses wealth widely and mitigates many demographic and resource problems. The war against terrorism is successful and international conflicts are minimal. Regional conflicts will remain at current levels or even increase in number. However the United Nations and regional organizations will be called upon to manage such conflicts because major states will minimize their direct involvement.
Scenario Two: Conflict Globalization
Global elites thrive, but the majority of the world's population fails to benefit from globalization. The trend toward more diverse, free-wheeling transnational terrorist networks leads to the formation of international terrorist coalitions with diverse anti-Western objectives and access to WMD. Population growth and resource scarcities place heavy burdens on many developing countries, and migration becomes a major source of interstate tension. Technologies not only fail to address the problems of developing countries but also are exploited by negative and illicit networks and incorporated into destabilizing weapons. The global economy splits into three: growth continues in developed countries; many developing countries experience low or negative per capita growth, resulting in a growing gap with the developed world; and the illicit economy grows dramatically. Governance and political leadership are weak at both the national and international levels. There will be increasing numbers of important actors on the world stage to challenge US leadership: countries such as China, Russia, India, Mexico, and Brazil; regional organizations such as the European Union; and a vast array of increasingly powerful multinational corporations and nonprofit organizations with their own interests to defend in the world.
Scenario Three: Regional Competition
The United States will continue to be a major force in the world community. US global economic, technological, military, and diplomatic influence will be unparalleled. Economic and political tensions with Europe grow, the US-European alliance deteriorates. Regional identities sharpen in Europe, Asia, and Russia, driven by growing political resistance in Europe and East Asia to US global preponderance and US-driven globalization and each region's increasing preoccupation with its own economic and political priorities. There is an uneven diffusion of technologies, reflecting differing regional concepts of intellectual property and attitudes towards biotechnology and info technologies. Regional economic integration in trade and finance increases, resulting in both fairly high levels of economic growth and rising regional competition. Both the state and institutions of regional governance thrive in major developed and emerging market countries, as governments recognize the need to resolve pressing regional problems and shift responsibilities from global to regional institutions. Africa’s international marginalization will increase. Most African states will miss out on the economic growth engendered elsewhere by globalization and by scientific and technological advances. Only a few countries will do better, while a handful of states will have hardly any relevance to the lives of their citizens.